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Introduction: 
The bold-faced headline in the February 14, 1861, edition of the New York Times 
read, "It is now proposed to reenact a highly protective tariff, for both revenue and 
protection. To the adoption at this crisis of such a measure there are certainly grave 
objections." With the secession of Texas from the Union just two weeks prior, and the 
fact that border states who "cherish [ ed] the deepest aversion" to tariffs were themselves 
teetering on the decision to secede, many Americans cringed to think of the national 
fallout such a measure would bring. That was not to mention the strain on foreign 
relations that was sure to follow. "Such are some of the features," argued the Times, "of 
this ill-timed, ill-advised, and if carried into effect, disastrous measure."1 Did Congress 
not understand that the passage of a tariff would do nothing but further escalate the 
already high tensions between North and South?2 Just thirteen days later, the Morrill 
Tariff was signed into law. 3 
On June 11, 1862, while the Civil War raged, Senator J . A McDougall took ????
1 New York Times. 14 February 1861. Page 4. 
2 Dates of Secession according to: 
http://www.iath.virginia.edu/vshadow2/outlines/secession.html 
State: 
South Carolina 
Mississippi 
Florida 
Alabama 
Georgia 
Louisiana 
Texas 
Date: 
Dec. 20, 1860. 
Jan. 9, 1861. 
Jan. 10, 1861. 
Jan. ll, 1861. 
Jan 19, 1861 
Jan. 26, 1861 
Feb. 1, 1861. 
Votes: 
169-0 
85-15 
62-7 
61-39 
208-89 
113-17 
166-8 
3 New York Times. 28 February 1861. Page 2. 
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podium of the United States Senate. "I have sought to avoid," he proclaimed, "argument 
and have asked action . .. I trusted that the senate was prepared to act upon it without 
extended argument . . . [but] I have lost faith in talking, I seek action." His fervent words 
reflected the frustration harbored by many present that day. Senator McDougall called for 
a railroad to the Pacific, and he desired immediate action. But many opposed such hasty 
legislation for a transcontinental railway. Their opposition centered on the rail's 
$62,880,000 price tag. How was a nation fighting for its very existence to afford such an 
expenditure? Yet on July 1, 1862, a bill authorizing the construction of a railroad and 
telegraph line to the Pacific Ocean landed on President Lincoln's desk and was signed 
into law.4 
How did legislation for such a provocative tariff and controversial railroad even 
reach the respective floors of the United States Senate and House ofRepresentatives? 
Why would Congress, in a time of unparalleled crisis, consider these bills, much less, 
pass them? In my discussion, I will argue that the tariff and Pacific railroad questions 
strongly influenced the convention, and thus the election of 1860. Also, that the 
Republican Congress took the 1860 election as a mandate to transform these matters into 
political action which they commenced under the guise of war and transformed into 
lasting policy. 
4 Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2nd Session., 11 June 1862, 307.; U.S. Statutes At Large. Vol. XII, p. 
489 ff 1 July 1862. 
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Political Environment: 
The reformation of the American political system during the late 1850s directly 
impacted political activity in the 1860s. Thus, to understand the legislative practices 
during the great cricsis, one must look at the political background in years preceding 
Southern secession. According to historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the Democratic 
Party, which had for so long been the voice of Southern conservatism in the United 
States, had split into two camps during the late 1850s over the issue of popular 
sovereignty. And the Whig Party, the voice of northern capitalists (the other national 
party in the two-party system), had in the 1850s "totally succumbed" to sectionalism over 
slavery; thus the Whig Party failed to exist as a national organization. 5 
This precarious political fallout of the two-party political system presented a 
surprisingly healthy environment for the blossoming of a new political organization. In 
1860, the newly formed Republican Party, comprised mainly of disillusioned Whigs such 
as William Seward and Horace Greeley but which also included radical abolitionists and 
former Democrats such as Hannibal Hamlin, stared national dominance in the face. By 
late 1858 and early 1859, party leaders recognized that if this delicate alliance of political 
opposites could be maintained, a Republican would soon be walking the halls of the 
White House. 
Ambition for the White House led the Republicans to nominate the relatively 
5 The Democratic Party was split over the issue of Popular Sovereignty, or "squatter's sovereignty" that 
was allowed through the Kansas-Nebraska Act. It allowed each state entering the Union to determine 
whether to be a slave state or a free state. Arthur. M. Schlesinger, edit. History of American Presidential 
Elections. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Publishing, 1963. Page I ll6.; 
http://www.tulane.edu/-latner/Background/BackgroundElection.html 
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unfamiliar Abraham Lincoln at the 1860 Chicago Convention. Chosen over the more 
publicized candidates, William Seward and Salmon Chase, because of his moderation, 
"He [Lincoln]," historian Hans Trefousse argues, "had carefully avoided extreme 
statements." Even on the volatile issue of slavery, "Lincoln was ready," agrees 
Schlesinger, "to offer guarantees for slavery in the [southern] states; he was even willing 
to enforce the fugitive slave law, . .. [though] he would not brook any further extension 
of slavery into the territories." Hence, it was Lincoln's middle-of-the-road stance, which 
gave him the 1860 Republican Party nomination for President of the United States. 6 
But Republican leaders needed more than a moderate candidate to maintain their 
united front. Due to the multifaceted nature of the party organization they needed a 
platform that would appease all sides and maintain unity. Schlesinger points out that, 
"While the slavery issue was central to the party's thinking, [sic] it alone could not 
guarantee success at the polls." Conservatives from Pennsylvania and Maine pushed for 
legislation restricting foreign imports, radicals from Midwestern states desired free land 
for settlers, radicals from New England called for improvements in shipping, and almost 
all delegates sought a railroad to the Pacific.7 
Thus to ensure unity and therefore a Republican victory in the 1860 election, the 
Convention adopted a platform including resolutions such as a call for a tariff, a call for 
free land to settlers, a call for improvements to rivers and harbors, and a call for a 
6 Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pages 2, 18; 
The Republican Party was formed between 1854 and 1856. Hans Trefousse. The Radical Republicans. New 
York: Knopf Publishing, 1969. Page 133; Schlesinger. History of United States Political Parties. 1162. 
7 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. History of United States Political Parties. 1160. 
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railroad to the Pacific. When the election was over, the Republican Congress enacted 
laws which mirrored most of these resolutions. Along with abolition of slavery, these 
achievements their legacy in history. 8 
8 12. That, while providing revenue for the support of the General Government by duties upon imports, sound policy 
requires such an adjustment of these imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interest of the whole 
country; and we commend that policy of national exchanges which secures to the working men liberal wages, to 
agriculture remunerative prices, to mechanics and manufactures an adequate reward for their skill, labor, and enterprise, 
and to the nation commercial prosperity and independence. 
13. That we protest against any sale or alienation to others of the Public Lands held by actual settlers, and against any 
view of the Homestead policy which regards the settlers as paupers or suppliants for public bounty; and we demand the 
passage by Congress of the complete and satisfactory Homestead measure which has already passed the House. 
15. That appropriations by Congress for River and Harbor improvements of a National character, required for the 
accommodation and security of an existing commerce, are authorized by the Constitution, and justified by the obligations 
of Government to protect the lives and property of its citizens. 
16. That a Railroad to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interest of the whole country; that the Federal 
Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction; and that, as preliminary thereto, a daily 
Overland Mail should be promptly established. 
Sections 12,13, 15, 16: 1860 Republican Party Platform. 
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The Tariff: 
I. 
According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Sr., economic issues, specifically trade 
issues, divided the nation along geographical lines for most of the antebellum era: 
The political events ofthe "Middle Period" of American history (1800-1860) find 
their explanation very largely in the sectionalization of American life which, 
during this period, divided the nation into three distinct economic areas, a broad 
western zone of independent small farmers, a northern seaboard section in which 
manufacturing was becoming the dominant interest, and a southern seaboard area 
wedded to cotton and slave culture. 9 
These geographical boundaries increasingly became political boundaries: Whigs 
and later Republicans being prominent in the North and West, and Democrats being 
prominent in the South. "On the level of politics," states historian Eric Foner, "the 
coming of the civil war is the story of the intrusion of sectional ideology into the political 
system, despite efforts of political leaders of both parties to keep it out." As the years 
passed, the economic sectionalization of America brought an ideological sectionalization 
between the two political parties. 10 
As early as 1816, Whig and Democrat Representatives in both the U. S. Senate 
and House hotly debated legislation supporting protective tariffs. "The objective of 
protecting manufacturers was," according to Whig Senator Henry Clay, "that we might 
9 Arthur M. Schlesinger. Sr. New Viewpoints in American History. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1925. 
Page 58. 
10 Eric Foner. Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980. Pages 35-36. · 
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eventua1ly get articles of necessity made as cheap at home as they could be imported, and 
thereby to produce an independence of foreign countries." Yet many shared Senator 
Huger's fears of duties "the consequence of which would be to tax the community to give 
a monopoly to a few large manufacturers. " 11 
Arguments and legislation for and against duties were, according to historian and 
economist Frank W. Taussig, continuously brought to United States Senate and House 
floors between 1816 and the late 1830s. Prominent Whig leaders such as Senators Henry 
Clay and Daniel Webster supported strong tariff legislation for both revenue and 
protection of industry, while equally prominent Democrats such as Senators John C. 
Calhoun and Stephen Douglas opposed all duties beyond what was needed to cover 
federal expenditures. Over the next two decades, however, Clay and his followers gained 
the upper hand. Rates were dramatically increased in 1824, 1828, and 1832. But the 1833 
Compromise Tariff Act, which was enforced until1842, reversed this trend toward 
protection. After years of quarreling, it seemed that Clay, Calhoun, and President 
Jackson, who all publicly supported this monumental act which would lower tariff rates 
across the board, had come to a final agreement.12 
11 Anna/so/Congress, House ofRepresentatives. 14 Congress. 1st Session. 1816, 1271-1279. 
12 "Clay, who drafted the act, probably had no expectation that the 20 per cent. [sic] rate ever would go into 
effect. He thought that Congress would amend before 1842, and intended to meet by his compromise the 
immediate emergency only." 
Year Duty, per cent. 
1834 87 
1836 80 
1838 72.5 
1840 65 
Jan. 1, 1842 42.5 
July 5, 1842 20 
Frank William Taussig. Tariff History of the Un??ed States. New York: Putnam Publishing, 1931 . 110-112. 
But just two months after duties had reached the Compromise's goal of twenty 
per cent, manufacturing interests lobbied Washington to raise tariff rates once again. To 
appease their manufacturing constituents, the Whig-controlled Congress then passed the 
Tariff of 1842, of which John C. Calhoun said "would act oppressively on those he 
represented, and the whole cotton-producing states." But Stephen Douglas, a Democrat 
Representative from Illinois, prophetically argued that "[this] system of prohibitory 
duties, whether adopted on the plea of protection, or for any other professed object, 
would lend necessarily to direct taxation. " 13 
According to New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley, the 1840 and 1844 
Democratic platforms reflected Douglas' ideals on the tariff and acted on their platform 
by lowering tariff rates. In 1846, the Democratic Congress and Democratic President 
James K. Polk implemented the Tariff Act of 1846, which lowered duties across the 
board. In 1857, Democratic President Franklin Pierce and a heavily Democratic Senate 
further reduced tariffs on goods from cotton to leather to "medicated roots," despite 
objections from Whig representatives such as Pennsylvania Senator Campbell, who 
called the 1857 bill, "a measure which strikes down the great industrial interests of the 
country." While they did lower duties considerably, neither act completely eliminated 
tariffs. But, "there is no doubt," says Taussig, "that the period from 1846 to 1860 was a 
time of great material prosperity ... "14 
13 Michael Cowan. http://www.fujisan.demon.co.uk/USPresidents/plistlc.htm; John C. Calhoun. The 
Speeches of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 4. 1854. 164; Congressional Globe. 28 Congress. I Session. 3 June 
1844. App., 598. 
14 "4. Resolved, That justice and sound policy forbid the Federal Government to foster one branch of 
industry to the determent of another, or to cherish the interest of one portion to the injury of another portion 
of our common country--that every citizen and every section of the country has a right to demand and i?sist 
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The crisis of 1857, however, brought renewed protectionist economics into the 
political limelight. This was championed by Henry C. Carey, a Pennsylvania economist 
who urged that "the interests of the capitalist and the laborer, are .. . in perfect ???????
with each other, as each derived advantage from every measure that tends to facilitate the 
growth of ??????????According to author Kenneth Stampp, many felt that industry "had 
suffered enough" and it was time to relieve their pain by raising duties. One of Senator 
Seward's constituents wrote, "'It is going to be the great question, now and will enter 
largely I think into the canvass of 1860. "'15 
II. 
From the late 1830s through 1860, political organization in the United States 
endured upheaval the likes of which had not been seen to date. This turmoil can in no 
better way be exemplified than by the merciless caning of the Democratic Senator 
Charles Sumner from Massachusetts by Democratic Representative Preston S. Brooks 
upon an equality of rights and privileges, and to complete and ample protection of persons and property 
from domestic violence or foreign aggression. 
5. Resolved, That it is the duty of every branch of government to enforce and practice the most rigid 
economy in conduction our public affairs, and that no more revenue ought to be raised than is required to 
defray the necessary expenses of the government., 
The above resolutions are taken from the Democratic National Conventions of 1840 and 1844. 
Horace Greeley. The Political Text Book for 1860. New York: Tribune Association, 1860. Pages 18-25.; 
New York Times. 4 March 1857. Page 7.; New York Times. 5 March 1857. Page 2.; Taussig. The Tariff 
History of the United States. Pages 155-170. 
F. W. Taussig. The Tarif!Historyofthe United States. Pages 155-170; 
Steven Douglass, a prominent Democratic Senator from Illinois, "Charged that the Whig tariff bills 
discriminated against agriculture, favored the rich at the expense of the poor, and were injurious to western 
interests." Robert W. Johannsen. Stephen A. Douglas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Page 121; 
Carey. Political Economy. Vol. I. 339. As quoted by Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. Page 
19. Letter from Myron H. Clark to William Seward, as quoted by Kenneth M. Stampp. America in 1857. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Page 233 . 
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from South Carolina. For politicians of this time, regional ties were stronger than was 
party affiliation. 16 
Regional politics aided in the appearance of fringe parties, who in boom-and-bust 
form then faded from the American Political scene. In 1839, the Liberty Party, made up 
of radical northerners who called for the total abolition of slavery, was formed. While the 
Liberty Party was a political failure, it was a pattern for other fringe parties to follow. 
These followers included the Know Nothing Party which originated in 1844, and the Free 
Soil Party of 1848. Other groups such as the Barnbumers (who also called for free land) 
also followed, however, these groups were never considered "parties. "17 
In 1854, another fringe party, calling itself the Republican Party, evolved. "The 
Mo. {Missouri} Democrat of August 20.," early Republican Edward Bates records in his 
diary, "contains a circular address of the Republican National Committee . .. It declares 
16 "An aggressive abolitionist, Sumner attacked the fugitive slave taws, denounced the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act of 1854, and on May 19-20, 1856,_ delivered his notable antislavery speech called 'The Crime against 
Kansas.' A master of invective, he singled out as his special victim Senator Andrew Pickens Butler of South 
Carolina, who was not there to reply. Two days later he was assaulted in the Senate chamber by Preston S. 
Brooks, Butler's nephew." http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/12468.html; 
"Sumner, a descendent of New England Puritans, was a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law 
School. He was a scholar of the law and briefly taught at Harvard. Impressive in both voice and appearance, 
he was a classic, elegant nineteenth-century orator who, while sometimes insensitive to the impact of his 
words, composed his Senate speeches while meticulous care . . . Sumner's assailant, Preston Brooks, was a 
handsome young man of thirty-seven, the son of an Edgefield, South Carolina, planter, a graduate of South 
Carolina College, and a veteran of the Mexican War ... On the evening ofJanuary 27, [1857] ... he was 
suddenly stricken with 'spasmatic paroxysm' that impaired his breathing, and within a few minutes, after 
'violent heaving of the chest and lungs,' his breathing stopped." Kenneth M. Stampp. America in 1857. 
Pages. 15-17.; 
In the fourth resolution of the 1856 Whig National Convention Platform we see that Whigs state an 
"absolute necessity for avoiding geographical parties." As quoted from Horace Greeley. Political Text ?????
for 1860. Page 25. 
17 These Free Sailers were mainly midwesterners who wanted the government to give, or at least offer at 
nominal cost, free land to farmers. Joseph G. Rayback. Free Soil, the Election of 1848. Lexington: 
University Press ofKentucky, 1970. Pages 58-59.; The"Know?Nothings" originated under the name the 
''Native American Party" and called for people who were not born in the United States to be limited in their 
political influence. Thurlow Weed Barnes. Memoir of Thurlow Weed New York: Houghton Mifllin 
Publishing. 1884. Page 224. 
) 
that 'the Republican party had its origin in the obvious necessity for the resistance to the 
aggression of the slave power and maintaining for the states respectively their reserved 
rights and sovereignties."' Grandson of Thurlow Weed, Thurlow Weed Barnes agrees 
calling the fonnation of the Republican party, "an organized protest against the repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise and the wrongs inflicted upon free soil settlers in 'bleeding 
Kansas. "'18 
The origin of the Republican Party was pointed and specific to slavery to be sure. 
This fact is reflected in their 1856 platfonn and nomination of John Fremont for the 
Presidency. The party's scope expanded, however, in the ensuing four years by absorbing 
planks of the Liberty, Free Soil, and Know Nothing parties by 1860. While absorbing the 
ideas of other fringe groups was helpful, without the conversion of a majority of 
prominent Whigs and northern Democrats to the Republican faith, the Republican Party 
would have never reached political prominence. 19 
One cannot overstate the importance that Whig deserters played in the fonnation 
18 Howard K. Beale, editor. The Diary of Edward Bates. New York, Da Capo Press, 1971. Page 43.; 
Thurlow Weed Barnes. Memoir of Thurlow Weed. Page 24 I. 
19 2. Resolved: That, with our Republican fathers, we hold it to be a self-evident truth, that all men are 
endowed with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness, and that the primary obj?ct 
and ulterior design of our Federal Government were to secure these rights to all persons under its exclusive 
jurisdiction; that, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished Slavery in all our National Territory, 
ordained that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it becomes 
our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of 
establishing Slavery in the Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its existence or 
extension therein. That we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislation, of any individual, or 
association of individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory ofthe United States, while the 
present Constitution shall be maintained. 
Resolution 2 from the 1856 Republican Party Platform as quoted from Horace Greeley's A Political Text 
Book for 1860 (Page 22.) shows that the Republican Party of the day had an especially strong emphasis on 
preventing the spread of slavery. Their calls for free land, nativism, and tariff protection were not present 
until their platform in 1860 (see introduction). 
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of the Republican Party Platform of 1860. Edward Bates, William Seward, Abraham 
Lincoln, Horace Greeley, and Thurlow Weed, all prominent figures in the 1860 
Republican Convention, were all former Whigs. In fact, Edward Bates was the president 
of the 1856 Whig Convention in Baltimore.20 
Ill. 
The importance of Whig converts to the 1860 Republican National convention 
lends to the assumption that Whig ideals were equally important. Indeed, with the crisis 
of 1857 still fresh in their minds, Whigs fought hard to make sure the protection of 
manufacturing interests played an important role in the 1860 Republican National 
Convention. Delegates from New York, Maine and Pennsylvania (New York and 
Pennsylvania were then, as now, crucial Electoral College states) insisted on a tariff 
resolution. '"Let our motto be,' said a ?????????????Congressman in 1860, 'protections to 
everything American against everything foreign.'" Less extreme supporters of the tariff 
plank pointed out that higher duties were needed to reflect higher governmental 
expenditures because tariffs were the only source of governmental income. 21 
Economically liberal ex-Democrats and radicals in the Republican Party 
disagreed with former Whigs on how to deal with the tariff issue. Senator Charles 
???????of Massachusetts and Ohio Governor Salmon P. Chase were both vocal 
advocates of free trade. William Cullan Bryant, a former Democrat, believed there was 
20 Horace Greeley. A Political Text-Book for 1860. Page 25 
21 Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. Pages 175-176; The fact that Whigs made a large 
contribution to the I 860 Republican convention is seen in that the Republican National Platform of I 856 did 
not call for a protective tariff. The Whig Nation Platform of 1852, however, did call for protective tariff, and 
the wording ofthat 1852 Resolution is very similar to the wording used in the 1860 Resolution of the 
Republican National Platform. Horace Greeley. A Political Text-Book for 1860. Pages 18-19, 25 . 
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"a 'conspiracy ... to pervert the Republican Party for the purposes of the . . . coal and 
iron mines.'" Many conservatives in the Republican Party did attempt to "refashion the 
party platform entirely" by downplaying the issue of slavery and refocusing on economic 
issues, the tariffbeing most important. Former Whig and editor of the New York ????????
Horace Greeley was accused of "'trying ... to get up a clamor for protection . ??William 
Seward and Thaddeus Stevens both supported Greeley's sentiments. The issue was so 
divisive that many moderate politicians such as Lincoln believed that tariffs should be 
avoided entirely in the convention. 22 
Oddly, it was radical John Kasson, whose beliefs least supported protection, who 
wrote the resolution, frustrating the Pennsylvania delegation. His resolution called for 
governmental duties on imports, to "encourage the development of industrial interest of 
the whole country . .. which secures to the working men liberal wages ... to mechanics 
and manufactures an adequate reward for skill, labor and enterprise, and to the nation 
commercial prosperity and independence." This call for a tariff, however, was so 
ambiguous that even though the Pennsylvania contingent at the Convention publicly 
applauded its reading; they privately expressed grave disappointment in its lack of 
content.23 
22 Kenneth Stampp. America in 1857. Pages 234-235. Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. Pages 
105, 168, 174-6, 202-3 .; William Cullen Bryant as quoted by Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. 
Pages 175-176.; William Cullen Bryant was a poet by nature, attorney by training, and editor/owner of the 
New York Evening Post by trade. 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????1&pg=2&br= 1 
23 John Kasson was a congressman from Iowa. Howard K. Beale, editor. The Diary of Edward Bates. Page 
649; 
"12. Providing revenue for the support of the General Government by duties upon imports, sound policy requires such an 
adjustment of these imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interest of the whole country; and we 
commend that policy of national exchanges which secures to the working men liberal wages, to agriculture renumerative 
prices, to mechanics and manufactures an adequate reward for their skill, labor, and enterprise, and to the nation 
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But moderation was the overriding theme of the 1860 Chicago Convention, not 
only in with regard to Kasson's tariff resolution, but also in the nomination of candidates. 
"Although the Republican Party of 1860," states author John Taylor, "was hardly the 
political juggernaut it would later become, the opposition appeared to be hopelessly 
disorganized." And because the Democratic Party in 1860 was divided, Republican Party 
managers knew their nominee would most likely be the next President of the United 
States. "24 
Indeed the Republican Party was on the road to the White House, but party 
leaders needed a moderate candidate who could maintain unity. Chase and Sumner had 
both been outspoken proponents of free trade making them almost non-factors in the 
nomination election. William Seward, while a strong protectionist, was also a strong 
abolitionist and thought by many to be unelectable. "A large section," writes Bates, "of 
the Republican Party . .. think that Mr. Seward's nomination would ensure defeat." 
Lincoln, who had avoided any extreme statements, benefited from his moderation. 
Political maneuverings by Horace Greeley and others also helped. And when the dust 
settled, Lincoln was selected to be the Republican Party's 1860 presidential nominee.25 
IV. 
On March 4, 1861 , Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated our Nation's sixteenth 
commercial prosperiLy and independence." Resolution 12: Republican Party Platform of 1860.; Eric Foner. 
Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. Page 203. 
24 John M. Taylor. William Henry Seward New York: Harper Collins Publishing, 1991. Page 2. 
25 Hans Trefousse. The Radical Republicans. Pages 132-3 .; Howard K. Beale, editor. The Diary of 
Edward Bates. Page 28. Horace Greeley. A Political Text Bookjor/860. Page 28. 
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President. Douglass and Breckenridge had indeed split the Democratic vote, and Lincoln 
won almost the entire North??26 Soon after the election, Republicans in the 35th Congress, 
led by Justin Morrill, taking the election results as a mandate by the American People, 
began working on protective legislation. This legislation came to be known as the Morrill 
Tariff Bill. 27 
Less than one month before South Carolina seceded from the Union, Republican 
Congressmen innocently began to transform governmental economic policy, creating 
what Taussig refers to as the "War Tariff? (all congressional legislation dealing with 
tariffs during the Civil War)???8 Beginning with the "Morrill Tariff," the Republicans 
revolutionized financial policy. This Tariff's original purpose was primarily "to raise 
revenue." Morrill claimed, '"no prohibitory duties have been aimed at"' while admitting 
that some manufacturing interests like iron and wool would be protected. 29 
When, by early February, the Morrill Tariff Bill was brought to the respective 
floors of Congress for discussion, seven Deep South states had seceded. Of course, 
Pennsylvania Congressmen led the fight to pass the bill. Mr. Kunkel of Pennsylvania 
26 http ://www.historyplace.com/civilwar/; 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. History of American Presidential Elections. Pages 1116, 1117. 
Lincoln Douglass Breckenridge Bell 
Popular Votes: 1,766,452 1,376,957 849,781 588,879 
Electoral Votes: 173 12 72 39 
27 Untill860, tariffs had been the sole source of income to the Federal Government. Revenue, though the Democrats had 
lowered rates in 1846 and 185 7, had been sufficient to cover Federal expenditures. But protectionists in Congress ?????as 
Mr. Justin Morrill and Mr. David Wells (who has been quoted as saying, "Whenever you see ahead, hit it; whenever you 
see a commodity, tax it.") took advantage of this opportunity to significantly raise the tariff rate. F. W. Taussig. Tariff 
History of the United States. Pages? I ??-170. 
28 http://www.iath.virginia.edu/vshado.w2/outlines/secession.html 
29 Statements of Justin Morrill as quoted by Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. Page 174. 
argued that incidental protection was acceptable because the benefit of the manufacturer 
is to the benefit of the entire country, aiding all American consumers.30 
There were significant objections to the Tariff, but these objections were quickly 
shot down by protectionist Congressmen. Though there were no legislators from the 
Deep South, many U. S. Senators from the border states and radical leaders spoke against 
the measure. Douglas of Illinois pointed out that it was not the proper time to push such 
issues that might further "alienate affections for the Union of the Southern people." In a 
vote, Senator Powell's amendment to the Morrill Tariff was defeated 37 to 18. Mr. 
Bigler, speaking for the majority, rebutted Douglas' statement, claiming that it was 
???????????all, .even border ???????????????????????that ???????? ????be raised.  . 
The Morrill Tariff, to many protectionists such as Mr. Bigler, Mr. Morrill, and 
Mr. Davis, was just a foot-in-the-door technique that allowed the raising of protective 
duties to still a higher level. Only a month had passed after the signing of the Morrill 
Tariff when Fort Sumter was fired upon and the Civil War began. Cards could not have 
fallen into the hand of the protectionists any better. In late July of 1860, "need for 
revenue" resulted in the first ever direct federal tax legislation in United States-history. 
Thus fulfilling Stephan Douglas' prophecy that high tariff rates would necessitate direct 
taxation. 32 
A revolving-door tariff and tax policy began to evolve. The Tariff had raised the 
price of foreign goods in order to make domestic goods more attractive to domestic 
30 Congressional Globe. 35 Congress. 2 Session. 24 February 1859. App. 234. 
31 New York Times. 21 February 1861. Page 4. 
32 F. W. Taussig. Tariff History of the United States. Pages 155-170; 
Goodge 17 
consumers. But the tax on domestic goods made foreign goods competitive once again. 
Hence, the Tariff and the Tax worked to counterbalance to each other. Because of 
increased demands for military funding, the Internal Revenue Act of July 1, 1862, which 
created the office of Internal Revenue, was passed. 33 Because the tax would make foreign 
goods competitive once again, the Tariff Act of July 14, 1862, immediately followed to 
appease protectionist manufacturers. 34 
Under the pretext of the War, this spiraling motion continually raised tariffs and 
taxes higher and higher. The most prominent examples ofthis are the Tariff and Revenue 
Acts of 1864. Each time, protectionists such as Wells and Morrill headed of the battle to 
raise the Tariff and Tax. Each time they said that was for the good of the war effort and 
for the good of the country.35 
Protectionist Congressmen probably did not purposefully raise tariffs in order to 
fulfill their economic theory, fiscally help themselves, or financially aid their friends, but 
their actions did create a highly protective trade policy. Though it seemed as if "Mr. 
Morrill, Mr. Stevens, and other gentlemen who shaped the revenue laws" used the 
33 New York Times. 31 July 1862. Page 4.; U. S. Statutes at Large. 37 Congress. 2nd Session. 1 July 1862. 
Chap. 119.  Page 432. 
"The first income tax was moderately progressive and ungraduated, imposing a 3% tax on annual incomes 
over $800 that exempted most wage earners. These taxes were not even collected until 1862, making 
alternative financing schemes like the Legal Tender Act critical in the interim. The Internal Revenue Act of 
1862 expanded the progressive nature _of the earlier act while.adding graduations: jt.exempted the first $600, 
imposed a 3% rate on incomes between $600 and $10,000, and a 5% rate on those over $10,000. The Act 
exempted businesses worth less than $600 from value-added and receipts taxes. Taxes were withheld from 
the salaries of government employees as well as from dividends paid to corporations (the same method of 
collection later employed during World War II). In addition, the "sin" excise taxes..imposed in the 1862 act 
were designed to fall most heavily on products purchased by the affluent. Thaddeus Stevens lauded the 
progressivity of the tax system:" rtibar@aol.com 
34 U.S. Statutes at Large. 37th Congress. 2nd Session. 14 July 1862. Chap. -163. 543. 
35 U. S. Statutes at Large. 38th Congress. 2nd Session. 30 June 1.862 Chap.l7.1.2D2. 
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government's need of money to support the war effort as a way to carry out their personal 
protectionists theories, or to using tariffs to promote "private ends for themselves or 
others," it would be unfair to say they did any such thing on purpose. But the end result 
of their dealings with tariff rates was by all accounts significant protectionism. 
This protectionism lasted until 1883 and beyond, blossoming northern industry. 
When at last revisions were made, many manufacturers and capitalists considered high 
tariffs to be permanent policy and lobbied hard to protect the gains that they had won 
twenty years earlier. Their efforts were successful, and indeed, protective trade policy 
remained the norm well into the twentieth century, allowing for the expansion of 
manufacturing in the North, specifically the steel industry in Pennsylvania and the textile 
industry in New England. 36 
Hence, Republicans utilized the tariff issue to help unite the party in a coalition to 
elect Mr. Lincoln. They then took his election as a mandate to put their protection plank 
into action. Under the guise of raising revenue to pay for the War, they were able to 
obscenely increase tariff rates, and keep them high for more than thirty years. 
36 This section was taken from F. W. Taussig. Tariff History of the United States. Pages 155-170. 
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The Transcontinental Railroad: 
I. 
Like the Tariff, the issue of a transcontinental railroad divided the nation along 
geographical lines during the late antebellum era. "Throughout the 1850s, Californians 
were repeatedly disappointed by the failure of Congress to pass legislation to establish a 
Pacific Railroad." Congress received several "sensible" proposals, yet no progress was 
made because "Congress was not ready yet to act, hamstrung as it was by the slavery 
question. "37 
Northerners wanted the Railroad to follow a northern route and Southerners 
wanted the railroad to follow a southern route. Northerners feared a southern route would 
give slavery a connection with newly acquired territory from Mexico, "including 
California." Southerners would not support a northern route because they were afraid that 
Northerners would use the railroad to spread out and claim all public lands along its path. 
"The Pacific Railroad is not only but begun," Edward Bates wrote in 1859, "but its very 
location is scrabbled for by angry sections, which succeed in nothing but mutual 
defeat. "38 
Unlike a protective tariff, while Northerners and Southerners disagreed on the 
details of a transcontinental railroad, "all party platforms favor [ed] a Pacific Railway." 
37 George Kraus. The High Road to Promontory. Palo Alto, Calif., American West Publishing. 1969. Page 
17. [The Transcontinental Railroad was often called the Pacific Railroad]. 
38 "The Iron Road" was a PBS special produced by Goodwin. Excerpts can be found online at 
HTTP://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/iron/index.htrnl.; George Kraus. The High Road to Promontory. Page 
17.; From Howard K. Beale, editor. The Diary of Edward Bates. Page 8. 
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President Buchanan (a Democrat) highly favored the railway, and Republican 
Representative Campbell agreed, stating, "the road is a necessity." In fact, the 
Democratic platforms of 1856 and 1860, and the Republican platform of 1856, all 
included resolutions calling for a railroad to the Pacific. 39 
While the tariff resolution necessitated special attention to maintain party unity, 
the railroad resolution merely needed to be addressed. Ex-Democrats, former Whigs, and 
radicals strongly debated the need for and wording of the tariff resolution. But all groups 
agreed on the need to call for a railroad. Wording only held peripheral importance. This 
can be seen in the resolution's complete ambiguity: "That a Railroad to the Pacific Ocean 
is imperatively demanded by the interest of the whole country; that the Federal 
Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction; and that, as 
preliminary thereto, a daily Overland Mail should be promptly established." This non-
specific wording of the Railroad resolution to the 1860 Republican Party Plank was 
enough. Party leaders needed only to have such a resolution on the books. 40 
n. 
The Morrill Tariff Bill breezed through Congress not only because of the 
secession of seven Southern States (and thus its fiercest detractors), but also because it 
39 New York Times. 30 January 1861. Page 2. 
Its original goal was to quicken the carrying of mails across the country, to aid in commerce between the 
East and West and most importantly help fulfill the American ideal of Manifest Destiny. George Kraus. The 
High Road to Promontory. Page 17.; Horace Greeley. A Political Text Book for 1860. Pages 22-30.; That a 
Railroad to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interest of the whole country; that the Federal 
Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction; and that, as preliminary thereto, 
a daily Overland Mail should be promptly established. Resolution 16: 1860 Republican Party Platform. 
40 David Haward Bain. The Empire Express. New York: Viking Publishing, 1999. Page 106.; Eric Foner. 
Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. Page 175.; 
Resolution 16: Republican Platform of 1860. 
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produced revenue. Unlike a tariff, building a railroad requires capital instead of creating 
it. The New York Times claimed that both bills were ill-timed and ill-advised.41 But in 
contrast to the Morrill Tariff became law almost immediately, the Transcontinental 
Railroad Bill upon making it to the floor of Congress, it was "put over for consideration 
until the next session," due to its costs.42 
On January 31, 1862, however, freshman Congressman A. A. Sargent "interrupted 
an afternoon's drone on the state of the Union with a stirring speech for action on, 
'Federal aid to the Pacific Railroad."' He proclaimed that the war demanded it. With an 
authority unknown to freshmen Congressmen, he argued that the Union needed a quick 
form of troop and supply transport to aid in the Western Theater. His words stirred the 
Railroad Committee into action. They nominated Sargent to take charge of drafting the 
bill. Sargent then enlisted Theodore Judah, chief engineer for Central Pacific Railroad to 
manage the details. The fruit of their labor was a bill "that satisfied the local interest of 
the most aggressive and politically influential railroad concerns."43 
But representatives from other railroad companies adamantly lobbied to have this 
bill amended. Congressman James E. Wilson echoed their concerns, criticizing the bill 
because it favored Judah's Central Pacific Railroad Company over other railroad 
companies. However, as southern legislators were not present to lobby for a southern 
route, and popular sentiment favored immediate action, the arguments surrounding the 
41 New York Times. 30 January 1861. Page 7.; Ibid. 14 February 1861. Page 4. 
42 George Kraus. The High Road to Promontory. Page 21 . 
43 Robert West Howard. The Great Iron Trail. New York: Bonanza Books, 1962. Pages 119-120.; George 
Kraus. The High Road to Promontory. Pages 40-42.; Congressional Globe. 37th Congress. 2nd Session. 31 
January 1862. 599-603. 
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Central Pacific Railroad Company did not keep the legislation from going to vote. On 
June 20, 1862, the Senate version ofthe bill passed with a margin of "31 to 8." Four days 
later, the House passed the bill and sent it to President Lincoln. Eleven days later he 
signed the Pacific Railroad Bill into law. 44 
m. 
Republican Congressmen, as they did with the "War Tariff," continued to pass 
additional railroad legislation throughout the War. This set an economic policy 
precedent, which was followed for years to come. Representative Hiram Price, who 
"pledged to advance the cause of Iowa railroads," introduced two bills intended to amend 
the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act. The U. S. Senate passed these on July 1, 1864. 
Republicans pushed them through the House to President Lincoln. Having just been re-
nominated by the Republican Party and heading for an election in the fall, he eagerly 
signed them the next day. 45 
There is a similarity in the readiness and speed ofthe Republican Congress during 
the War in introducing and passing tariff and railroad legislation, but there is an even 
stronger contrast between reasoning and purpose laying behind the two. According to 
Taussig, the major supporters of Tariff legislation were not out for personal gain. If 
personal gain did occur, it was incidental and not the result of a conscious effort on their 
part. This was not the case for Congressmen supporting railroad issue. While easily 
44 David Haward Bain. The Empire Express. Page 115; Congressional Globe. 37th. Congress. 2nd Session. 
17 Apri11862. 1704.; New York Times. 30 January 1861. Page 7.; Ibid. 14 February .1862. Page 4; U S. 
Stahttes at Large. Pacific Railroad Act. 1 July 1862. Vol. XII, page 489 ff.; Congressional Globe. 37th 
Congress 2nd Session. 20 June 1862. 2830. 
45 Congressional Globe. 38th Congress. 1st Session. 1 July 1864. 3459.; Robert West Howard. The Great 
Iron Trail. 1962. Pages 169-170. 
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rationalized that it was for the good of the country, "there was the constant congressional 
companion of self-interest ... " Of these, "most notably, old Thaddeus Stevens of 
Pennsylvania, partner in an iron works that made track rails, insisted on an amendment 
stipulating that only American iron could be used on the road." According to records 
from 1861 and 1862, LP&W (a railroad company) handed out stock certificates to United 
States Representatives and Senators with a face value totaling $4,137,000. And Theodore 
Judah, the chief engineer for Central Pacific, passed out over $60,000 in Central Pacific 
stock on Capital Hill in 1861. Hence, lobbyists enticed legislators with personal financial 
gain when deciding the future course of railroad legislation. 46 
IV. 
Though created under shady circumstances, this Congressional railroad 
legislation brought the completion of the transcontinental railway, allowing American 
industry to blossom and flourish. 
In 1869, after a long, bitter and often terrifying struggle against Indian attacks, 
brutal weather, floods, labor shortages, political chicanery, lawlessness and a war, 
the first transcontinental railroad finally became a reality. Now the way was open 
for vast expansion and social changes that would make America the industrial 
giant of the world . . . one of the great engineering feats of history and ... a 
fascinating chapter in the development of our country. 47 
46 David Haward Bain. The Empire Express. Page 108.; Congressional Globe. 37 Congress. 2 Session. 1 
May 1862. Page 1909. 
47 Rails Across the Continent: The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad by Enid Johnson. Text Courtesy Walt 
Winter. http:/ /cprr. org/index.html#Promontory 
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Hence, though railroad issues did not have as much political importance as the 
issue of the Tariff, it was an important legislative issue soon after Lincoln's first election. 
Also, like the Morrill Tariff, the Pacific Railroad Act was passed swiftly through 
Congress over minority objection. But while the supporters of protective legislation met 
their political goals without being swayed by personal gain, the supporters of railway 
legislation met their political goals by being swayed by personal gain. 
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Conclusions: 
The election of 1860 took place during the greatest crisis that the United States 
had ever seen. Secession seemed inevitable. So why would the Republican Party hold 
resolutions that were so anti-conciliatory? Why did they not give up party politics in 
order to save the Union? 
Abraham Lincoln hit the nail on the head when he said "a house divided will not 
stand." The slavery issue was going to pull the entire country in one direction or all the 
other. There could be no lasting compromise. Hence, so long as the Democratic South 
held views apologetic to slavery there would never be a longstanding reconciliation. In 
1860, knowing that reconciliation was not likely, Republican leadership sought to take 
advantage of the political vacuum that had developed. But they knew that in order to win 
the election, unity within the Republican Party was critical. Protectionists from 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Maine needed to be appeased, and a railroad to the Pacific 
needed to be called for. Hence, Republican Party had no choice but to call for action in 
these and other areas. 
After having won a landslide decision in the 1860 election, the Republican Party 
saw the victory of Abraham Lincoln as a mandate by the people of the United States. 
Hence, they set to work toward tariff and railroad legislation even before Lincoln was 
inaugurated and before the new Congress came into power. 
Whigs, and later Republicans had held both the tariff and railroad issues as 
important for many years. South Democrats had thwarted action in the case of the 
railroad and even enacted opposing legislation as in the case of the tariff This had been a 
continual frustration to Whig and later Republican legislators. The secession of the Deep 
South 
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had given the Republican Party an opportunity to enact these bills that they held 
close to their hearts. 
It was terrible for the nation, but the Civil War was a terrific opportunity for the 
passage of the Tariff and Railroad Acts. The country needed revenue and needed a way 
to transport troops and supplies across the country with haste. What better guise could 
protectionists such as Henry Carey or rail-expansionists such as Theodore Judah have 
asked for? The War opened the way for the original passage of the Tariff and Railroad 
Acts. It also provided the political means necessary to expand and amend these acts over 
time. From their wartime foundation these acts formed the basis for Federal Policy in 
both areas for years to come. 
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